Legal aspects of Anthony Bland's case
In appealing the primary decision, the arguments of the Official Solicitor were that firstly, withdrawal of ANH would constitute an act intended to cause death and as such it would be unlawful, and secondly, that discontinuation of ANH would be a breach of a doctor' s duty of care. He argued that in allowing the withdrawal of basic life-sustaining treatment the Law would condone euthanasia. He also made a distinction with regards to duty of care that ANH should be viewed separately to other medical interventions.
The declaration allowing withdrawal was initially granted by the President of Family Division and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The Official Solicitor applied to the House of Lords, where the appeal was unanimously dismissed. 3 By far the most important issue addressed by the House of Lords was that life-sustaining therapy may be lawfully withheld in an adult patient lacking competence. As Lord Goff of Chieveley noted, 'It would, in my opinion, be a deplorable state of affairs if no authoritative guidance could be given to the medical profession in a case such as the present, so that a doctor would be compelled either to act contrary to the principles of medical ethics established by his professional body or to risk a prosecution for murder.' He added, 'I do not consider that, in circumstances such as these, a doctor is required to initiate or to continue life-prolonging treatment or care in the best interests of his patient.' 3 The judges addressed the Official Solicitor' s arguments in a variety of ways. They emphasised non-malicious intent and consideration of the patient' s best interests. If continuing to live could not be viewed to be in his best interest, treatment could be lawfully withheld and to do otherwise, if done knowingly, would constitute an act of battery and tort against the patient. Removing or abstaining from an intervention judged not to be in the patient' s best interest was to be seen as an act consistent with duty of care. It was also noted that from a philosophical Classic cases revisited: Anthony Bland and withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration in the UK point of view, given the patient' s vegetative condition, he may have had no 'interests' at all. The Bolam principle 4 and cases of a similar nature occurring in other jurisdictions (see below) were used to justify the opinions expressed.
An important distinction was also made between 'allowing to die' through the act of omission and 'causing death' through the act of commission, the latter being considered euthanasia and therefore illegal. The positive act of commission, through which death is caused, was the main argument of the Official Solicitor. Lord Browne-Wilkinson stressed, 'Apart from the act of removing the nasogastric tube, the mere failure to continue to do what you have previously done is not, in any ordinary sense, to do anything positive: on the contrary it is by definition an omission to do what you have previously done.' He added, 'The positive act of removing the nasogastric tube presents more difficulty. It is undoubtedly a positive act, similar to switching off a ventilator in the case of a patient whose life is being sustained by artificial ventilation. But in my judgment in neither case should the act be classified as positive, since to do so would be to introduce intolerably fine distinctions. If, instead of removing the nasogastric tube, it was left in place but no further nutrients were provided for the tube to convey to the patient's stomach, that would not be an act of commission. Again, as has been pointed out … if the switching off of a ventilator were to be classified as a positive act, exactly the same result can be achieved by installing a time-clock which requires to be re-set every 12 hours: the failure to re-set the machine could not be classified as a positive act. In my judgment, essentially what is being done is to omit to feed or to ventilate: the removal of the nasogastric tube or the switching off of a ventilator are merely incidents of that omission.' 3 A similar approach has been considered to solve a different problem, in a different jurisdiction. In Israel, Halakhic law permits withholding treatment, but prohibits withdrawal. By introducing a timer on a ventilator, a continuous treatment is changed to a discrete one. In failing to re-start a ventilator, one performs an act of omission, an act of withholding, which can create an acceptable approach to avoiding what might be deemed a futile intervention. 5 While Anthony Bland' s and subsequent PVS cases have clarified the legal perspective on withdrawal of treatment, they are not fully representative of the challenges encountered in intensive care. The PVS is non-terminal; decisions lack urgency, and the patient' s permanent lack of perception renders assumptions about burdens and benefits meaningless. It has therefore been argued that the very concept of 'best interests' used to underpin the judgment in Bland is questionable. 6 Nevertheless, the principle of 'best interests' still holds for emergency situations, terminal cases or situations of perceived futility often encountered in the intensive care environment. However, while artificial nutrition and hydration constitute medical treatment and as such do not have to be given if deemed to serve no purpose (ie, the futility argument), some may consider ANH an appropriate comfort measure. It was noted in the judgment in the Bland case that, consistent with the arguments above, in the context of PVS, ANH did not offer comfort. This may not apply in all acute cases.
Wider implications, other than the 'slippery slope' of euthanasia debate, were also raised in the Bland case. 'Recent developments in medical science have fundamentally affected these previous certainties. In medicine, the cessation of breathing or of heartbeat is no longer death' 3 noted Lord Browne-Wilkinson who, with others, considered it a matter of importance to bridge the gap between law and moral duties in the context of evolving medical science.
Vegetative state, ANH, medical decision-making and professional guidance
When considering the importance of the Bland case to medical decision-making, it is important to outline the terminology encountered in this and other similar cases. The vegetative state is a neurological condition in which patients appear to be awake but show no sign of awareness of themselves or their environment. 7 The concept of sleep-wake cycles in this condition appears counter-intuitive but is attributable to preservation of hypothalamic function. The vegetative state is considered to be part of a spectrum of disorders of consciousness that include coma, minimally conscious state and locked-in syndrome but excludes the locked-in syndrome of conscious-awareness with limited means of expression. The vegetative state is deemed permanent in the UK if it is present for more than six months when the underlying pathology is non-traumatic, or more than 12 months when the cause is traumatic injury. Diagnostic difficulties are not uncommon, and while prognosis may be poor, the approach to long-term care varies on a case-by-case basis. The case of Anthony Devine may well serve as an example of an alternative fate of another Hillsborough victim afflicted with PVS. Mr Devine' s parents elected to continue to care for him, and have done so for over 20 years. Reportedly, there has been some improvement and Mr Devine might be minimally conscious. Clearly, labels of 'right' or 'wrong' treatment are difficult to apply to decisions made for individual patients. The individual nature of each case underscores the need for referral to Court of Protection should a decision to withdraw ANH in these circumstances be sought. Many clinicians may feel ill at ease if asked to withdraw ANH in a stable PVS patient, rather than when their condition is complicated by critical illness.
When considering advice from regulatory bodies, the General Medical Council (GMC) states that all patients are entitled to food and drink of adequate quantity and quality. 8 It also notes that ANH may 'provide symptom relief, or prolong or improve the quality of a patient' s life.' From a pragmatic viewpoint, however, ANH is significantly removed from normal oral intake, with tubes, pumps and formulated products bearing the hallmarks of medical intervention. It is also accepted that the benefits of feeding the dying patient are unclear and that the consequences of interventions required to facilitate ANH as well as the process itself may add to distress and overall suffering. Furthermore, any decision to stop feeding can be complemented by high quality palliative care to prevent any possible distress caused by this course of action.
It should be noted that the recent GMC guidance has introduced a change in terminology, from ANH to CANH (clinically assisted nutrition and hydration) that encompasses hydration and feeding both via the IV route and through nasogastric and gastrostomy tubes. The GMC still however Ethics adopts the principle set out in Bland that CANH constitutes medical treatment and as such should be treated as any other medical intervention that is subject to a burden vs benefit assessment. As such, CANH may be withdrawn if deemed not in the patient' s best interest as agreed by all relevant parties. As a form of medical treatment, it should also be noted that patients cannot demand CANH. Although Leslie Burke, a Lancaster postman suffering from cerebellar ataxia, has previously successfully challenged this stance on the grounds of contravention of Human Rights, the primary ruling was overturned after appeal by the GMC. 9, 10 The present-day law and withdrawal of ANH While the appeal in Anthony Bland' s case was rejected unanimously, Lord Mustill' s comment still rings true: 'It would in my opinion be too optimistic to suppose that this is the end of the matter, and that in the future the doctors (or perhaps the judges of the High Court) will be able without difficulty to solve all future cases by ascertaining the facts and applying to them the precepts established in the speeches delivered today. The dozens of cases in the American courts have shown that the subject is too difficult, and the situations too diverse, for the law to be settled by a single appeal.' 3 While individual cases will continue to stir controversy, the judgment in the case of Anthony Bland and other similar cases have paved the road from case law to statute, contributing to the foundation of the Mental Capacity Act of 2005. The Act makes provision for persons lacking capacity by formalising assessment of competence for decisionmaking and the determination of best interests. The Act also allows forward planning for future loss of capacity with advance directives and the appointment of individuals with lasting power of attorney for personal welfare, including decision-making on life-sustaining medical treatment. It should be noted however that such an individual would not be able to prescribe a course of action or omission that was not considered to be in the patient's broader best interests, and the views of the next of kin as to the patient' s values and beliefs are not invariably given over-riding weighting. This principle is emphasised in the recently reported case of M, where an application was made to the Court of Protection by the family for withdrawal of ANH in a 'minimally conscious' patient and in which the judge decided in favour of preservation of life. 11
Other notable cases
The legal backdrop to the decision of the Lords regarding Mr Bland included those of Ms Nancy Cruzan (Cruzan vs Director, Missouri Department of Health), 12 Mr Herbert Barber (Barber vs Superior Court of State of California, 1983) 13 and Re: Gardner (534 A 2d. 947, 949, 1987), 14 all involving withdrawal of ANH. Ms Nancy Cruzan was a victim of a road traffic accident who remained in a coma for seven years before courts granted her family' s request to remove the feeding tube. It was argued that the constitutional right to liberty may trump the State' s interest to protect life. As such, this case was a landmark case in the USA. Mr Herbert Barber remained in a coma following a cardiac arrest. Two physicians who initially withdrew mechanical ventilation and later withdrew ANH were charged with murder and conspiracy to murder. Both were cleared of the charges. Finally, in re: Gardner, withdrawal of ANH was performed in a 22-year-old accident victim in a PVS, based on the principle of substituted judgment.
More recent cases include those of Terri Schiavo in Florida, USA, Eluana Englaro in Italy and Aruna Shanbaug in India. Terri Schiavo' s case (withdrawal of ANH in the context of PVS) took seven years, and included 14 appeals and government intervention by President George W Bush before withdrawal of ANH finally took place. 15, 16 Eluana Englaro, 'the comatose woman at the centre of a euthanasia debate that has divided Italy and sparked a constitutional crisis,' as a reporter for the Sunday Times put it, was in a PVS for 17 years before being allowed to die. 20 The Vatican' s Health Minister condemned the death stating: 'I will continue to regard her death as a crime.' Consequent to this case, Italy' s Lower House passed end-of-life legislation that makes it illegal to withdraw ANH. 21 The turmoil associated with both the Eluana Englaro and Terri Schiavo cases is compatible with attitudes towards withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment seen in strongly religious societies such as southern European countries. 22 Finally, the case of Ms Aruna Shanbaug, a nurse remaining in a profoundly neurologically-damaged state for 37 years, has been popularised by a journalist, spurring a court ruling in India that may permit passive euthanasia by withdrawal of ANH in selected cases. 23
Conclusion
It is the authors' impression that the unanimous decision of all eight judges involved in Anthony Bland' s case was a reflection of a need for a pragmatic approach to the evolving complexity of modern medicine. It was also a moral decision that required careful justification in legal terms, given the possibility of being viewed as endorsing euthanasia. In defying death, modern medicine has forced a review of what constitutes an acceptable quality-of-life and the basis on which medical treatment should continue to be provided when meaningful neurological recovery is impossible. Against this backdrop, it is likely that cultural and religious beliefs or legal restraints will continue to impact on withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration. Given the emotive context, the act of its withdrawal is likely to continue to be defined by the 'anti-euthanasia' lobby as a form of 'killing' and by the remainder of society as pragmatic but potentially 'inhumane.' Knowledge of the legal, professional and public attitudes towards withdrawal of ANH remains important for those involved in making difficult end-of-life decisions.
